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Unusual Unanimity and the
Ongoing Debate on the Meaning
of Words: The Labor and
Employment Decisions from the
Supreme Court's 2013-14 Term
Michael Z. Green*
I. Introduction
In its 2013-14 term, the Supreme Court focused on labor rela-
tions, wage and hour law, whistleblowing, and employee benefits in
several cases. The Court also addressed constitutional issues concern-
ing the First Amendment, the Recess Appointments Clause, and affir-
mative action. The Court did not decide any employment discrimina-
tion cases during the term. Decisions in the prior term clarified the
definition of a supervisor for purposes of workplace harassment' and
addressed the burden of proof in establishing causation in retaliation
claims.2 The Court's respite from considering employment discrimina-
tion cases in 2013-14 was, however, very brief as three discrimination
cases are scheduled for consideration during the 2014-15 term.3 The
* Professor, Texas A&M University School of Law. I would like to thank my student
assistants Ali Crocker, Emily Goodman, Casandra Johnson, Mackenzie Lewis, Hisham
Masri, and Chelsea Mikulencak for their diligent research efforts in reviewing the Su-
preme Court decisions and oral arguments. I am also grateful for the financial support
from the Texas A&M University School of Law summer research grant in producing
this Article. I am proud to follow in the footsteps of so many wonderful past secretaries
for the ABA Labor and Employment Section who have assessed the labor and employ-
ment decisions of prior Supreme Court terms.
1. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2443 (2013) ("We hold that an em-
ployer may be vicariously liable for an employee's unlawful harassment only when the
employer has empowered that employee to take tangible employment actions against
the victim.").
2. Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013) ("Title VII
retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation"
and "[t]his requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the
absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.").
3. See E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2013),
cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 44 (Mem.) (Oct. 2, 2014) (No. 14-86) (whether the refusal to hire
a woman because she wore a hijab [religious headscarf] to her interview is religious dis-
crimination); Young v. United Parcel Serv., 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. granted,
134 S. Ct. 2898 (Mem.) (July 1, 2014) (No. 12-1226) (whether an employer must reason-
ably accommodate pregnant employees to avoid employment discrimination under the
Americans with Disabilities Act); Mach Mining, LLC v. E.E.O.C., 738 F.3d 171 (7th
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Court also expects to address labor and employee benefits, whistle-
blowing, and wage and hour law during the 2014-15 term.
4
Even without employment discrimination cases, the 2013-14 term
provided ten key cases of importance to labor and employment law-
yers. Three of these involved distinctly different matters of concern
for organized labor: Sandifer v. US. Steel Corp.,5 NLRB v. Noel Can-
ning,6 and Harris v. Quinn.7 Two addressed employee whistleblowing
matters: Lawson v. FMR LLC8 and Lane v. Franks.9 Three focused on
employee benefits: Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance
Co.,10 Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer,1 1 and Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc.12 Two cases addressed issues tangentially related
to employment law: one involving affirmative action, Schuette v. Coali-
tion to Defend Affirmative Action, 13 and another involving taxation of
severance payments, United States v. Quality Stores, Inc. 14
The Court initially agreed to hear two other labor and employ-
ment cases this term but subsequently found its decisions to review
improvidently granted.15 In one of those cases, three justices vigor-
ously dissented from the decision that the Court had improvidently
Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2872 (Mem.) (June 30, 2014) (No. 13-1019) (review-
ability of the scope of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's conciliation ef-
forts before it may sue an employer for discrimination).
4. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers' Ass'n, 720 F.3d 966 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted,
134 S. Ct. 2820 (Mem.) (June 16, 2014) (No. 13-1041) (agency authority to change mort-
gage loan officer exemption criteria under the FLSA); MacLean v. Dep't of Homeland
Sec., 714 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2290 (Mem.) (May 19,
2014) (No. 13-894) (considering if communication is specifically prohibited under the
Whistleblower Protection Act); Tibble v. Edison Int'l, 729 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2013),
cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 43 (Mem.) (Oct. 2, 2014) (No. 13-550) (whether initial purchase
of high-cost investment mutual funds instead of lower-cost funds commenced the ERISA
six-year statute of limitations period or if continuing to offer these high-cost funds when
lower funds were available represented a continuing breach of fiduciary duty); M&G
Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 733 F.3d 589 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct.
2136 (Mem.) (May 5, 2014) (No. 13-1010) (labor and employee retirement benefits); In-
tegrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 713 F.3d 525 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134
S. Ct. 1490 (Mem.) (Mar. 3, 2014) (No. 13-433) (FLSA compensatory time for collective
action).
5. 134 S. Ct. 870 (2014).
6. 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
7. 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
8. 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2014).
9. 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014).
10. 134 S. Ct. 604 (2013).
11. 134 S. Ct. 2459 (2014).
12. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
13. 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
14. 134 S. Ct. 1395 (2014).
15. UNITE HERE Local 355 v. Mulhall, 667 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. im-
providently granted per curiam, 134 S. Ct. 594 (Dec. 10, 2013) (No. 12-9912-99); Madigan
v. Levin, 692 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. improvidently granted per curiam, 134 S. Ct. 2
(Oct. 15, 2013) (No. 12-872).
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granted certiorari.16 As a result, the issue in that case-whether the
government may impose criminal penalties against employers and
unions that enter into neutrality agreements with respect to future
labor organizing-will likely return to the Court in the near future. 17
The authors of an empirical examination of Court decisions from
1946 to 2011 found that five of the current members of the Court are
in the top ten of all justices who were "friendliest to business," with
Justice Samuel Alito and Chief Justice John Roberts being the two
"most favorable to business."1 8 As a result, the study's authors con-
cluded "that the Roberts Court is indeed highly pro-business-the con-
servatives extremely so and the liberals only moderately liberal."1 9 In
assessing this past term, one commentator mentioned that the Su-
preme Court generated "a remarkable record of unanimous rulings:
nearly two-thirds of the [Clourt's 70 signed opinions."2 Nevertheless,
the same commentator noted that some believe this unanimity was de-
ceptive and have mockingly called it "fauxnanimity."21 Justice Antonin
Scalia led this attack, asserting that several "specious" unanimous de-
cisions arose from unanimous agreement on a limited result with blis-
tering concurring opinions questioning the majority's rationale. 22 A
great number of the debates centered on different approaches to inter-
preting the meaning of words.23 While this jurisprudential debate is
not new, several labor and employment cases offered an opportunity
16. Mulhall, 134 S. Ct. at 594-95 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Sotomayor, J.,
and Kagan, J.).
17. See id. at 595 ("Unless resolved, the differences among the Courts of Appeals
could negatively affect the collective-bargaining process.").
18. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in
the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1448-51, tbl.77 (2013) (study of Supreme
Court justices).
19. Id. at 1449.
20. Marcia Coyle, Small Steps, Major Consequences: The Supreme Court's Rulings
Could Undermine Key Precedents in Future, NAT'L L.J., July 7, 2014, at 1.
21. Marcia Coyle, Ginsburg on Rulings, Race: Justice Says Public Dismay About
Congress Spills Over to High Court, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 22, 2014, at 3 (the "fauxnanimity"
criticism of some of the Court's unanimous decisions during the 2013-14 term while
also asking Justice Ginsburg about Justice Scalia's claim of "'specious' unanimity" in
a decision regarding buffering zones for abortion clinics and Noel Canning); Dahlia Lith-
wick, Supreme Court Breakfast Table: The Justices Don't Like Massachusetts' Buffer
Zones. But They're Fine with the One Around the Supreme Court, SLATE SUPREME
COURT TABLE, June 26, 2014, at 1, 2 ("This morning, the Supreme Court handed down
two unanimous decisions (I am inventing the word faux-nanimous effective immediately
to account for [Justice] Scalia's very dissent-y concurrences) in two of the most hotly con-
tested cases of the term [and t]he first is Canning, the recess appointments case.").
22. Linda Greenhouse, Tragedy or Triumph, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2014), at 5, http:/
www.nytimes.com/2014/09/04/opinion/tragedy-or-triumph.html (A key example of this
type of unanimous decision is NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014), in which
Justice Scalia, in reading his concurring opinion from the bench, "denounced the Court's
'judicial adventurism' and made abundantly clear that this was a dissent in all but the
most formal sense.").
23. See discussion infra Part VI.
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for members of the Court to flex their intellectual muscles while inter-
preting the intent and meaning of words.
This Article first addresses the Court's decisions of significance to
organized labor. The Article next discusses the Court's review of whis-
tleblowing matters. It then describes the implications for employees
and employers of employee benefits cases. The Article then reviews
two cases regarding important, but tangential, concerns in labor and
employment law even though those cases did not arise in the work-
place context. To explore the common theme of false unanimity, this
Article reviews both the unanimous components of the decisions as
well as the justices' existing divisions, especially over different ap-
proaches to interpreting the meaning of words. Finally, the Article
identifies the significance of the Supreme Court's 2013-14 labor and
employment decisions and forecasts similar issues likely in store for
the Court in the near future.
II. Organized Labor: Clothing Changes as Wages,
Agency Recess Appointments, and Public Sector
Union Fair Share Dues
Three cases addressed concerns of organized labor and employers
who deal with organized labor. In Sandifer,24 the Court explored a col-
lective bargaining agreement that made time spent "changing clothes"
noncompensable under federal wage and hour law.2 5 In Noel Can-
ning,2 6 the president's ability to make a valid Senate-recess appoint-
ment of a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) member repre-
sented an important issue, with respect to not only the Constitution,
but also the viability of a major federal agency charged with protecting
the rights of employees to engage in concerted and union activity. Fi-
nally, in Harris17 the Court examined the viability and enforcement
of public sector labor laws that require unions to receive a "fair
share" or agency fee from employees who choose not to join the
union. 28 Another case, in which the Court decided it had improvi-
dently granted review, had raised a labor issue likely to return to
the Court. 29 A case scheduled for the 2014-15 term involves a labor
and employee retirement benefits issue.30 As a result, it appears
24. Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870 (2014).
25. Id. at 880-81.
26. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
27. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
28. Id. at 2658.
29. See supra note 16-17 and accompanying text (describing UNITE HERE Local
355 v. Mulhall, 667 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. improvidently granted per curiam,
134 S. Ct. 594 (Dec. 10, 2013) (No. 12-99), and how the issue is likely to come back to
the Court).
30. M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 733 F.3d 589 (6th Cir. 2013), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 2136 (Mem.) (May 5, 2014) (No. 13-1010).
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that organized labor's legal concerns will be among the matters on the
Court's extremely busy docket.
A. Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp.
In a decision involving the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(FLSA),3 1 written by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Gins-
burg, Stephen Breyer, Samuel Alito, and Elena Kagan, the Court ad-
dressed the meaning of the phrase "changing clothes" in section 203(o)
of the FLSA.32 The petitioners, current and former employees of U.S.
Steel Corporation, filed a collective action seeking back pay for time
spent donning and doffing protective gear while beginning or ending
work.33 Section 203(o) "allows parties to decide, as part of a collective-
bargaining agreement, that 'time spent in changing clothes.., at the
beginning or end of each workday' is noncompensable." 34 A 1949
amendment established "that the compensability of time spent chang-
ing clothes or washing is a subject appropriately committed to collective
bargaining" between an employer and a union representing its
employees. 3
5
U.S. Steel conceded that it would have compensated employees for
time spent donning and doffing protective gear if section 203(o) had not
rendered that time noncompensable as part of a collective bargaining
agreement covering the employees. 36 In contrast, the employees argued
that the donning and doffing of the protective gear did not qualify as
"changing clothes" pursuant to section 203(o).37 As a result, the Court
had to determine the meaning of "clothes" under section 203(o). The
Court reviewed the dictionary definition of "clothes" at the time Con-
gress enacted the provision and decided that "clothes" had the ordinary
meaning of "items that are both designed and used to cover the body
and are commonly regarded as articles of dress."38
The Court rejected the employees' claim that the definition of
"clothes" excluded "items designed and used to protect against work-
place hazards" because Webster's dictionary during that period pro-
vided that clothes are for comfort. 39 The Court explained that
31. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2012).
32. Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870, 873-74, n.7 (2014) (Justice Soto-
mayor joined the opinion except with respect to footnote 7, in which the Court stated
that although "exemptions ... are to be narrowly construed against the employers seek-
ing to assert them," this "narrow-construction principle" does not apply to the definition
provision of FLSA § 203).
33. Id. at 874 n.1.
34. Id. at 874 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203(o)).
35. Id. at 876.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 877.
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"'protection' and 'comfort' are not incompatible, and are often
synonymous."
40
Further, the Court determined that an attempt to distinguish
"items designed and used to protect against workplace hazards" from
the definition of clothes would turn the purpose of section 203(o) to
"nothingness" because the clothes at issue must be integral to job per-
formance.4 1 Also, the application of this purported distinction for
safety items "abandons the assertion that clothes are for decency or
comfort. ,4 2 The Court acknowledged that the meaning of "clothes"
under section 203(o) of the FLSA does "not embrace . . . essentially
anything worn on the body" as there are some "wearable items that
are not clothes, such as some equipment and devices."4
3
The Court also analyzed "changing" to assess whether adding lay-
ers or putting on additional clothes constituted changing if the original
clothes remained. The Court found that "despite the usual meaning of
'changing clothes,' the broader statutory context makes it plain that
'time spent in changing clothes' includes time spent in altering
dress."4 4 Further, if the purpose of section 203(o) was "to permit collec-
tive bargaining over the compensability of clothes-changing time and to
promote the predictability achieved through mutually beneficial negoti-
ation," then "changing" could not be limited to just "substituting."4 5
The Court applied its definition of clothes to the following twelve
items raised by the employees: "a flame-retardant jacket, pair of pants
and hood; a hardhat; a snood; wristlets; work gloves; leggings; meta-
tarsal boots; safety glasses; earplugs; and a respirator."46 The Court
found that the first nine items were "clearly ... designed and used
to cover the body and are commonly regarded as articles of dress."4 7
The glasses and earplugs were not usually considered articles of
dress even if they have a covering function.4 8 Also, a respirator does
not have a covering function; nor can it be considered an article of
dress. 49 As a result, these three items-glasses, earplugs, and
respirators-were not clothes under section 203(o).50
However, the Sandifer Court concluded that time spent donning
and doffing safety glasses and ear plugs was "minimal.151 If the
40. Id. (the Court identified gloves as an example of an item that protects a person
from scrapes and cuts while also enhancing a person's comfort).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 878; see also id. at n.6 (description of a "wristwatch").
44. Id. at 879.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 880.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 881.
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majority of time was spent "changing clothes" as defined under section
203(o), the entire time, even time spent donning and doffing non-
clothes items such as safety glasses and ear plugs, was still time
spent "changing clothes."52 The Court, on the other hand, specifically
mentioned that if the majority of time is spent putting on and taking
off nonclothes items, the time would not qualify as "time spent in
changing clothes" and would not be negotiable as noncompensable
under section 203(o). 53
With respect to respirators, employees used them only as needed
throughout the normal workday.54 Consequently, section 203(o) did
not cover respirator usage here as a preliminary or postliminary sub-
ject covered by section 203(o).55 Thus, the Court affirmed the Seventh
Circuit decision approving summary judgment for the employer be-
cause (1) under section 203(o) the employer and union had negotiated
the time spent putting on and taking off the nine clothes items as non-
compensable pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, 56 (2) the
time spent putting on and taking off nonclothes items at the beginning
and end of workdays was minimal and subsumed by the time spent
changing the nine clothes items, 57 and (3) section 203(o) did not
cover the time spent putting on respirators as it did not occur during
the beginning or end of the workday.
58
B. NLRB v. Noel Canning
In Noel Canning, the Court determined whether President Barack
Obama validly appointed three NLRB members during a three-day ad-
journment of the Senate pursuant to the Recess Appointments Clause
of the Constitution.59 That clause states the president has the power
"to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Sen-
ate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their
next Session."6 The Court first addressed whether the words "Recess
of the Senate" referred only to an intersession recess or also to an in-
trasession recess. 1 There was no dispute whether the clause applied
during intersession recesses.6 2 However, the Court held that the
clause applied to both an intersession recess and an "intra-session
recess of substantial length. '6 3
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 873.
55. Id. at 881.
56. Id. at 880-81.
57. Id. at 874.
58. Id. at 881.
59. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2552 (2014).
60. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
61. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2556 (discussing U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 3).
62. Id. at 2561.
63. Id.
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The Court discussed the meaning of the word "recess" at the time
of the Constitution's drafting and decided that "[tihe Founders them-
selves used the word to refer to intra-session, as well as to inter-
session, breaks."6 The Court also noted that even "though the 40th
Congress impeached President [Andrew] Johnson on charges relating
to his appointment power, he was not accused of violating the Consti-
tution by making intra-session recess appointments."6 5 The Court
then acknowledged the pragmatic implications of its holding: "if we in-
clude military appointments, Presidents have made thousands of
intra-session recess appointments" throughout the Recess Appoint-
ments Clause's existence. 66
The Court addressed three arguments the parties raised. The first
argument was that the founders did not intend to apply the Recess Ap-
pointments Clause to anything but intersession recesses as they
"hardly knew any other" type of recess. 6 7 The Court concluded that
"[t]he Founders knew they were writing a document designed to
apply to ever-changing circumstances over centuries" because "a Con-
stitution is 'intended to endure for ages to come,' and must adapt itself
to a future that can only be 'seen dimly,' if at all."168
The second argument challenging the NLRB appointments was
that allowing intrasession appointments would make the length of
those appointments illogical. 69 The Court rejected this argument as
well and noted how long it normally takes to appoint someone even
when the Senate is actively in session. 70
The third argument challenging the appointments was that in-
cluding intrasession recesses would make the Recess Appointments
Clause vague. 71 The Court responded, "One can find problems of un-
certainty, however, either way" and described examples of how uncer-
tainty could also occur during intersession breaks. 72
As a result, the Court decided that both intrasession and interses-
sion recesses are included within the Clause's coverage. 73 The Court
limited its holding, finding that the language regarding "[viacancies
that may happen during the recess of the Senate" means only vacan-
cies that occur during the recess or before the recess. 74 The words
"may happen" helped convince the Court to also include vacancies
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2562.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2564.
68. Id. at 2565.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2567.
74. Id.
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that occurred before the recess instead of a narrower reading limited
to just vacancies during the recess.7 5 While ordinarily meaning "to
originate," the Court found that the words "may happen" also meant
the "chance to be."7
6
The Court then addressed the concern that under its broad read-
ing of the clause, as opposed to the narrower interpretation that Jus-
tice Scalia posed, 77 the president could completely circumvent the Sen-
ate's role in the appointment process. 78 The Court determined that
because "both interpretations carry with them some risk of undesir-
able consequences,... the narrower interpretation risks undermining
constitutionally conferred powers more seriously and more often."
79
According to the Court, the narrower interpretation would also pre-
vent the president from making "any recess appointment that arose
before a recess, no matter who the official, no matter how dire the
need, no matter how uncontroversial the appointment, and no matter
how late in the session the office fell vacant."8' 0
In finding the Recess Appointments Clause ambiguous, the Court
decided it would not "upset the compromises and working arrange-
ments" of prior presidents and Senates who established a common his-
torical practice of making appointments for recesses lasting at least
ten or more days."1 The Court held that, "for purposes of the Recess
Appointments Clause, the Senate is in session when it says it is, pro-
vided that, under its own rules, it retains the capacity to transact Sen-
ate business" and "[tihe Senate met that standard here."8 2
The Court also considered if a specific break was still part of a ses-
sion or a recess and, if it was a recess, whether it was sufficiently long
for the NLRB appointments in Noel Canning to be valid.s3 The Court
concluded that the Senate's pro forma gatherings at issue in the case
were part of a session, not a recess.8 4 Nevertheless, the Court found
that a recess of four to nine days is "presumptively too short" to create
an opening for the president to make an appointment and a recess of
three days or fewer is absolutely too short for a constitutionally valid
appointment.8 5 As a result, the Court deemed the three-day break be-
tween pro forma sessions in Noel Canning too short to give the
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2568.
77. See id at 2606.
78. Id. at 2569.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2569-70.
81. Id. at 2553, 2560.
82. Id. at 2574.
83. Id. at 2573.
84. Id. at 2575.
85. Id. at 2566-67, 2599.
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president the constitutional authority to make the NLRB member
recess appointments at issue.8 6
In concurring, Justice Scalia agreed that the president did not
have the authority to appoint the NLRB members, but nonetheless
vehemently criticized the majority's textual interpretation of the Re-
cess Appointments Clause.8 7 According to Justice Scalia, the only ap-
pointments available to the president under the clause must have
arisen during an intersession and the appointment had to be made
during that intersession. s Specifically, Justice Scalia stated that
"[wihat the majority needs to sustain its judgment is an ambiguous
text and a clear historical practice" when "[wihat it has is a clear
text and an at-best-ambiguous historical practice."8 9 Because Justice
Scalia found the words "[riecess" and "happens" to be clear, he vigor-
ously asserted that the Court's interpretation allowing intrasession
appointments was incorrect even if the Court agreed unanimously
about the judgment.
C. Harris v. Quinn
In a five-four decision by Justice Alito, Harris addressed "whether
the First Amendment permits a State to compel [in-home,] personal
care providers to subsidize speech on matters of public concern by a
union that they do not wish to join or support."9 1 The Court held
that the First Amendment did not permit this state action. 92 The
Court first explained the employment structure for in-home personal
care providers who visit disabled individuals through Medicaid-waiver
programs of the Illinois Department of Human Services.93 The dis-
abled person, the "customer," employs those personal care providers. 94
The Court held that the customer, as the employer, maintains control
over the relationship and decides what services the provider delivers
86. Id. at 2574.
87. See id. at 2592-618.
88. Id. at 2605.
89. Id. at 2617.
90. Id. at 2595, 2606. Justice Scalia's concerns about the broader application of the
Court's analysis in Noel Canning were highlighted recently in a D.C. Circuit case chal-
lenging the appointment of NLRB Member Craig Becker by President Obama on
March 17, 2010, during an intrasession recess of seventeen days. See Matthew Enter.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 771 F.3d 812, 813-14 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Member Becker's appointment
was valid under Noel Canning, which suggested that a recess of more than ten days
was constitutionally valid); see also Gestamp S.C., LLC v. NLRB, 769 F.3d 254, 257
(4th Cir. 2014) (appointment of NLRB Member Becker was constitutionally valid
under Noel Canning); Teamsters Local Union No. 455 v. NLRB, 765 F.3d 1198, 1200-
01 (10th Cir. 2014) (same).
91. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2623 (2014).
92. Id.
93. See id. at 2624.
94. Id.
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as the government only pays the provider and establishes minimum
employment requirements.
95
Illinois classified personal care providers as "'public employees' of
the State of Illinois-but '[slolely for the purposes of coverage under
the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act." 9 6 This allowed the union rep-
resenting these employees to charge a "fair share" or agency fee under
Illinois law to help pay for the cost of certain union representational
activities. 97 A union must fairly represent all members of a bargaining
unit including those who choose not to join and never pay full member-
ship dues.98 In requiring a fair share payment, the state law prevents
"free riders" from reaping the benefit of unionization without contrib-
uting to the costs. 99 According to the Court, the "personal assistants"
in Harris were "not state employees for any other purpose, 'including
but not limited to, purposes of vicarious liability in tort and purposes of
statutory retirement or health insurance benefits."'
100
Beyond finding that these employees were not public sector work-
ers, the Court went further to question on First Amendment grounds
its prior endorsement of fair share payments for public sector workers.
The Court had previously acknowledged the "free-rider" problem in its
1977 decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.10 1 As Abood
noted, if nonmembers are not required to pay union fees, employees
will choose to be nonmembers for economic reasons while still reaping
the benefits from the work the union performs for all employees. 102
In Harris, the Court decided that a ruling in favor of Illinois would
be a "very significant expansion of Abood-so that it applies, not just to
full-fledged public employees, but also to others deemed public employ-
ees solely for the purpose of unionization and collection of an agency
fee." 10 3 The Court discussed at length its "fair share" analysis since
Abood. In the end, the Court distinguished Harris from Abood because
'Abood . . . has clear boundaries; it applies to public employees."104
According to the Court, "[e]xtending those boundaries to encompass
partial-public employees, quasi-public employees, or simply private
employees would invite problems." 10 5
The Court also addressed the issue from the perspective of its
most recent public sector labor decision, Knox v. Service Employees
95. Id. at 2624-25.
96. Id. at 2626.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2656.
99. Id. at 2627.
100. Id. at 2626.
101. Id. at 2627 (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 97 S. Ct. 1782 (1977)).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2638.
105. Id.
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International Union, Local 1000,106 in which it had applied the com-
pelling state interest test to assess whether a government entity
could restrict an individual's First Amendment rights by requiring
payment of an agency fee for union representation. 1 7 The Court did
not find any compelling state interest to justify the fair share provision
in Harris.l"' Nothing in the record showed that the personal assis-
tants could not obtain similar benefits to those who voluntarily
chose to pay dues.1
0 9
The Court considered applying a balancing test from Pickering v.
Board of Education.110 While the Court asserted that the Pickering
balancing test did not apply to the circumstances,1 11 the Court held
that Illinois's actions would not pass that test in any event because
the balance favored First Amendment protection for the personal
assistants.112
Justice Kagan, in dissent, thought this case fell squarely within
the perimeter of Abood. 113 She asserted that "[tihe idea that Abood ap-
plies only if a union can bargain with the State over every issue [as op-
posed to the control that the patient has in deciding terms] comes from
nowhere and relates to nothing in that decision-and would revolu-
tionize public labor law."114 Justice Kagan also observed that while
the petitioners sought to overturn more than thirty years of sound pre-
cedent in Abood, "[tihe good news out of this case is clear: The majority
declined that radical request." 115
According to Justice Kagan, "[tihe true issue is whether Illinois has
a sufficient stake in, and control over, the petitioners' terms and condi-
tions of employment to implicate Abood's rationales and trigger its ap-
plication." 116 However, "[tihe bad news is just as simple: The majority
robbed Illinois of that choice in administering its in-home care pro-
gram."117 In closing, Justice Kagan stated: "The majority today misap-
plies Abood, which properly should control this case" as "[niothing
separates, for purposes of that decision, Illinois's personal assistants
from any other public employee." 118
106. 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
107. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2639 (citing Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2289).
108. Id. at 2639-40.
109. Id. at 2640-41.
110. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
111. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2641-42.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2645 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 2650.
115. Id. at 2658.
116. Id. at 2649.
117. Id. at 2658.
118. Id.
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III. Whistleblowing: Sarbanes-Oxley Private
Subcontractors and Public Sector Testimony
Whistleblower cases have become a recurring part of the Court's
docket. Two were considered during the 2013-14 term. One case, Law-
son,1 1 9 addressed the scope of coverage for employees of private sub-
contractors of publicly traded companies covered by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. 120 Another case, Lane,12 1 examined whether the First
Amendment protects public sector employees terminated for providing
whistleblowing testimony in court. 122 Another whistleblower case,
MacLean,123 is part of the Court's docket for the 2014-15 term.
A. Lawson v. FMR LLC
In Lawson, Justice Ginsburg's six-three decision reviewed the
scope of coverage under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)124 section
1514A, which provides employee whistleblower protection to deter
fraudulent financial disclosures regarding publicly traded compa-
nies. 125 In deciding whether statutory whistleblower protection
under SOX only extended to employees of publicly traded companies,
and not subcontractor employees, the Court found that section
1514A "shelters employees of private contractors and subcontractors,
just as it shelters employees of the public company served by the con-
tractors and subcontractors."' 12 6
The Court examined the statute's purpose and motivation. The
Court stated that "Congress identified the lack of whistleblower pro-
tection as 'a significant deficiency' in the law."127 The two Lawson
plaintiffs worked for separate private companies that provided advi-
sory and management services to Fidelity, a publicly traded com-
pany.128 Fidelity had no employees and instead contracted with out-
side companies to handle day-to-day operations.129
The main issue was whether section 1514A-which provides
whistleblower protection to employees of publicly traded companies
"or any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such
119. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2014).
120. Id. at 1159.
121. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014).
122. Id. at 2377.
123. MacLean v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 714 F.3d 1301, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert.
granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3470 (U.S. May 19, 2014) (No. 13-894) (whether federal air mar-
shal's claim of making a protected communication to a reporter under the federal Whis-
tleblower Protection Act exists if the communication involved disclosure of sensitive se-
curity information specifically prohibited by law).
124. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012).
126. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1161 (2014).
127. Id. at 1162-63.
128. Id. at 1164.
129. Id.
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company"-protected whistleblower employees of the outside compa-
nies.130 The Court advanced several reasons for its decision. First, the
Department of Labor's Arbitration Review Board (ARB), in an unre-
lated opinion issued after Lawson was heard at the appellate level,
held that section "1514A affords whistleblower protection to employees
of privately-held contractors that render services to public
companies."13
1
Second, the Court analyzed the statute's language and found that
"FMR's interpretation of the text requires insertion of 'of a public com-
pany' after an employee" when the statute's relevant portion reads "no
• . .contractor . . . may discharge . ..an employee." 132 The Court
pointed out that FMR's argument did not make sense because contrac-
tors would not have authority over the public company's employees. 133
The Court decided that the plain language means "[a] contractor may
not retaliate against its own employee for engaging in protected whis-
tleblowing."134 The employer argued that the statute referred only to
contractors in an "ax-wielder" position with the only responsibility
being to discharge employees. 135 The Court rejected this argument,
stating that even if an ax-wielder did the actual firing, the public com-
pany would still be the entity retaliating.136
The employer also raised two textual arguments. First, "[i]f. . . 'an
employee' includes employees of contractors, then grammatically, the
term also includes employees of public company officers and employ-
ees." 13 7 The Court found this was an unlikely hypothetical problem
as housekeepers and gardeners and other personal employees of public
company officers and employees were unlikely to become aware of ev-
idence of their employer's fraud involving a SOX whistleblower
claim. 138 Second, the employer argued that the statutory language's
heading only referred to publicly traded companies. 139 However, the
Court noted that "the headings here are 'but a short-hand reference
to the general subject matter' of the provision" and were "'not meant
to take the place of the detailed provisions of the text."' 140
Although it determined that the plain language was not ambigu-
ous, the Court still discussed the statutory intent revealed in the
130. Id. at 1163.
131. Id. at 1165.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1166.
134. Id.
135. Id. (using a character from the movie UP IN THE AIR, played by actor George
Clooney as an example of such an "ax-wielder").
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1168.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1169.
140. Id.
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legislative history. 141 The Court reasoned that if the statute was read as
FMR and the dissent suggested, there would be a hole in the protection
offered. All public companies would have to do to avoid SOX liability is
hire private contracted companies to perform their work and those em-
ployees would not have the whistleblower protection provided by section
1514A.1" 2 The Court also discussed the legislative reasoning for SOX
and concluded that Congress enacted section 1514A to "ward off another
Enron debacle."143 According to the Court, in enacting SOX Congress
was just as "focused on the role of Enron's outside contractors in facili-
tating the fraud as it was on the actions of Enron's own officers." 144
The Court also compared section 1514A to another whistleblower
statute, the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for
the 21st Century (AIR 21),145 that has similar language stating that
"[nlo air carrier or contractor or subcontractor of an air carrier may
discharge an employee." 146 The Court also found that "[tihe ARB has
consistently construed AIR 21 to cover contractor employees." 147 Due
to the "parallel text," the Court interpreted the two provisions consis-
tently because section 1514A was modeled on AIR 21.14' The Court
held that whistleblower protection under SOX extends to employees
of contractors and subcontractors. 149
B. Lane v. Franks
In Lane, Justice Sonia Sotomayor's unanimous opinion considered
whether the First Amendment protected a public employee who pro-
vided truthful sworn testimony in court when a subpoena compelled
the testimony and giving the testimony was outside the employee's
regular job duties.15 The Court decided that the employee's testimony
was protected speech. 151 In Lane, a community college president,
Franks, fired Lane, a director for the college, in retaliation for testi-
mony Lane gave against a former employee and political appointee,
Schmitz, during Schmitz's trial for mail fraud and theft. Lane had
fired Schmitz before the trial when he discovered that Schmitz had
been receiving compensation for a job she never performed, and
Lane was asked to testify at Schmitz's trial about his reasoning for ter-
minating Schmitz. 15 2
141. Id. at 1169-71.
142. Id. at 1182.
143. Id. at 1169.
144. Id.
145. 49 U.S.C. § 42121(a) (2012).
146. Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1175.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1176.
149. Id.
150. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2374-75 (2014).
151. Id. at 2375.
152. Id.
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The Court used a two-step inquiry from Garcetti v. Ceballos153 and
Pickering v. Board of Education 154 to determine if the government's in-
terest outweighed the employee's interest as a citizen and if the em-
ployee was entitled to First Amendment protection. 155 The two-step
inquiry from Garcetti is (1) "whether the employee spoke as a citizen
on a matter of public concern" 156 and (2) "whether the relevant govern-
ment entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee
differently from any other member of the general public."
15 7
The Court concluded that Lane met the first step by speaking as a
citizen. 158 The Court explained: "[siworn testimony in judicial proceed-
ings is a quintessential example of speech as a citizen for a simple rea-
son: Anyone who testifies in court bears an obligation, to the court and
society at large, to tell the truth."159 In response to the argument that
the employee's speech was different because it concerned information
learned from his job duties, the Court pointed out that "[tihe critical
question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinar-
ily within the scope of an employee's duties, not whether it merely con-
cerns those duties." 160
Speech based on information learned on the job can make a differ-
ence in Pickering balancing, but the Court decided that "[tihe impor-
tance of public employee speech is especially evident in the context of
this case: a public corruption scandal. '16 1 Further, "[uit would be anti-
thetical to our jurisprudence to conclude that the very kind of speech
necessary to prosecute corruption by public officials-speech by public
employees regarding information learned through their employment-
may never form the basis for a First Amendment retaliation
claim." 162 For these reasons, the Court determined that the employee's
testimony was speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern. 163
For the inquiry's second step, the Court used the Pickering balanc-
ing test. 164 That test "requires 'balance[ing] . . . the interests of the
[public employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees."165
The Court determined that,
153. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
154. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
155. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377-78.
156. Id. at 2378.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2379.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 2380.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2381.
165. Id. at 2377.
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[h]ere, the employer's side of the Pickering scale is entirely empty:
Respondents do not assert, and cannot demonstrate, any govern-
ment interest that tips the balance in their favor. There is no evi-
dence, for example, that Lane's testimony at Schmitz' trial was
false or erroneous or that Lane unnecessarily disclosed any sensitive,
confidential, or privileged information while testifying. 166
As a result, the Court held the speech protected. 167
The Court agreed that Franks was protected by qualified immu-
nity for the claims against him in his individual capacity because of
ambiguity regarding the application of Garcetti to assess Franks's ac-
tions. 168 With qualified immunity, "courts may not award damages
against a government official in his personal capacity unless 'the offi-
cial violated a statutory or constitutional right,' and 'the right was
'clearly established' at time of the challenged conduct.' ",169
Justice Thomas's succinct concurring opinion, in which Justices
Scalia and Alito joined, identified situations in which an employee
could testify as a part of job duties under the Garcetti inquiry's first
step, including testimony by police officers and laboratory analysts. 170
Nevertheless, the concurring opinion concluded that there was no rea-
son to address these constitutional questions and stated that the
Court's opinion "leaves the constitutional questions raised by these
scenarios for another day."
171
IV. Benefits: Plan Statute of Limitations, Presumptions of
Ordinary Prudence in Company Investments, and
Religious Objections to Contraceptive Coverage
For good or ill, issues involving employee benefits under the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)172 continue to
receive substantial attention from the Supreme Court. 173 The Court's
influence on employee benefits is likely to persist as new issues arise
under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) 174 and de-
bates occur about that statute's meaning and impact. 175 Cases decided
166. Id. at 2381.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 2384 (Thomas, J., concurring).
171. Id.
172. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(2012).
173. See Paul M. Secunda, Sorry, No Remedy: Intersectionality and the Grand
Irony of ERISA, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 131, 159-65 (2009) (an ongoing debate about employee
benefit law interpretations by the Supreme Court regarding the choice between a more
focused remedial approach and a majority-based approach).
174. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
175. See Brendan S. Maher, The Affordable Care Act, Remedy and Litigation Re-
form, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 649, 651-52 (2014) (the ACA "rewrote the law of private health
192 30 ABA JOURNAL OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW 175 (2015)
during the 2013-14 term further demonstrated the importance of em-
ployee benefits under ERISA and the ACA's burgeoning impact.
A. Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life
In Heimeshoff, Justice Thomas's unanimous opinion addressed
the plaintiff's ERISA claim arising from denial of long-term disability
benefits under a plan administered by Hartford. 176 Heimeshoff, a Wal-
mart manager, developed lupus and fibromyalgia. 177 Hartford denied
her claim for disability and, after exhaustion of agency procedures,
Heimeshoff sued in federal court.178
There is no statute of limitations defined under ERISA for Heime-
shoff's claim, but the employee's benefit plan provided a three-year
limitation from the time written proof of loss was required to be fur-
nished. 179 Because the plan's limitation period was over by the time
the ERISA court claim was filed, Heimeshoff argued that a limitation
period should not be applied unless the "statutes of limitations com-
mence upon accrual of the cause of action."1 8 0 The Court rejected
that argument."1" The Court held that parties may contract to a limi-
tation and a court "must give effect to the Plan's limitations provisions
unless we determine either that the period is unreasonably short, or
that a 'controlling statute' prevents the limitations provision from tak-
ing effect."1 2
Neither party had argued that the limitations period was unrea-
sonably short. Further, the statute of limitations in the plan did not
undermine the two-tiered remedial scheme requiring exhaustion of
plan remedies before pursuing court remedies under ERISA.1 8 3 If
the deadline had been set in bad faith, courts could have heard the
case because bad faith is an allowable basis to challenge a plan's lim-
itations period. 14 Also, in appropriate cases, a party may assert equi-
table defenses, such as waiver, estoppel, and tolling, to address any
concerns about enforcing the plan's statute of limitations.185
B. Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer
In Dudenhoeffer, Justice Breyer's unanimous opinion considered
former employees' claims that the employee stock option plan
insurance in America" and the author "predicts a series of flashpoints over which litiga-
tion reform battles will be fought").
176. Heimeshoffv. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 134 S. Ct. 604, 608-09 (2013).
177. Id. at 608.
178. Id. at 609.
179. Id. at 609-10.
180. Id. at 610.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 612.
183. Id. at 613.
184. Id. at 614.
185. Id. at 615-16.
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(ESOP) fiduciary had violated ERISA's duty of prudence by continuing
to invest in company stock purportedly known to be devaluing. 186 Spe-
cifically, the Court addressed "when an ESOP fiduciary's decision to
buy or hold the employer's stock is challenged in court, [whether]
the fiduciary is entitled to a defense-friendly standard that the lower
courts have called a 'presumption of prudence."'1
8 7
The Court considered four of the employer's arguments. l s1 "First,
petitioners argue that the special purpose of an ESOP-investing par-
ticipants' savings in stock of their employer-calls for a presumption
that such investments are prudent."18 9 The Court responded by point-
ing out that "[section 1104(a)(1)(D) of ERISA] makes clear that the
duty of prudence trumps the instructions of a plan document, such
as an instruction to invest exclusively in employer stock even if finan-
cial goals demand the contrary."190 Second, the employer argued that
the duty of prudence should be read in light of trust law under which
"the settlor can reduce or waive the prudent man standard of care by
specific language in the trust instrument. '" 19 1 The Court disagreed,
concluding that "trust documents cannot excuse trustees from their
duties under ERISA. 192
The employer's third argument asserted that, without the pru-
dence standard, fiduciaries could be seen as engaging in unlawful in-
sider trading.193 The Court held that that there was no distinction be-
tween fiduciaries in this situation and any other, and that ERISA
surely cannot require the breaking of insider trading laws. 1 9 4 The
Court further explained:
To state a claim for breach of the duty of prudence on the basis of in-
side information, a plaintiff must plausibly allege an alternative ac-
tion that the defendant could have taken that would have been con-
sistent with the securities laws and that a prudent fiduciary in the
same circumstances would not have viewed as more likely to harm
the fund than to help it.195
The employer also argued that "without some sort of special pre-
sumption, the threat of costly duty-of-prudence lawsuits will deter
companies from offering ESOP's to their employees, contrary to the
stated intent of Congress." 196 The Court rejected this argument,
186. Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459, 2463 (2014).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 2467.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 2468.
191. Id. at 2469.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 2469-70.
195. Id. at 2472.
196. Id. at 2471.
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stating, "we do not believe that the presumption at issue here is an ap-
propriate way to weed out meritless lawsuits or to provide the requi-
site 'balancing. '"197
According to the Court, "[tihe proposed presumption makes it im-
possible for a plaintiff to state a duty-of-prudence claim, no matter how
meritorious, unless the employer is in very bad economic circum-
stances." 198 The Court further explained that a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim would be the more appropriate approach to ad-
dress the plan's concerns.1 99 The Court vacated the court of appeals
decision and remanded the case because the plaintiff's alternate op-
tions for the fiduciaries' investments may not have been plausible. 20 0
Finally, the Court held that, on remand, the motion to dismiss stan-
dard should apply.20 1
C. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
In Hobby Lobby-a five-four opinion by Justice Alito-three
closely held corporations brought claims under both the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)20 2 and the First Amend-
ment. 20 3 The companies' owners believed that the ACA regulations,
as the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) interpreted
them, violated their sincerely held religious beliefs by mandating that
they provide employees with coverage for four types of contraceptives
that operate after conception. 204 The Court held these ACA mandates
violated the RFRA because they substantially burdened the claimants'
exercise of religion and did not provide the least restrictive means to
accomplish the ACA's goals. 20 5
The Court first considered whether the companies could bring a
claim under RFRA.20 6 The government argued that companies could
not bring their claims for several reasons: corporations are not "per-
sons" under the RFRA, corporations cannot "exercise religion," and it
is hard to ascertain the sincerely held "beliefs" of a corporation. 20 7
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that corporations are "persons"
under the RFRA by looking at the Dictionary Act 20 8 definition of a per-
son. 209 The Court then noted that the government conceded that
197. Id. at 2470.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 2471.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (2012).
203. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759, 2765 (2014).
204. Id. at 2759, 2766.
205. Id. at 2759-60.
206. Id. at 2767.
207. Id. at 2769-74.
208. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
209. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
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nonprofit corporations can exercise religion and there was no reason to
draw a line between nonprofits and for-profits because "[niot all corpo-
rations that decline to organize as nonprofits do so in order to maxi-
mize profits."2 10 Also, the Court identified various reasons why a com-
pany may not organize as a nonprofit organization, including the need
to lobby for legislation. 211 The Court noted: "It is quite a stretch to
argue that RFRA, a law enacted to provide very broad protection for
religious liberty, left for-profit corporations unprotected. '2 12
According to Justice Alito, "[i]f Title VII and similar laws show
anything, it is that Congress speaks with specificity when it intends
a religious accommodation not to extend to for-profit corporations. '" 213
Finally, when addressing the difficulty of assessing the sincerity of be-
liefs of corporations, the Court explained: "If Congress thought that
the federal courts were up to the job of dealing with insincere prisoner
claims, there is no reason to believe that Congress limited RFRA's
reach out of concern for the seemingly less difficult task of doing the
same in corporate cases."2 14 Also, the Court suggested that if multiple
owners have disputes about their religious beliefs on a particular mat-
ter, "[sitate corporate law provides a ready means for resolving" how
management conflicts should be addressed. 2 15
The Court next analyzed whether the HHS regulations substan-
tially burdened the companies' religious beliefs. The Court held the
HHS regulations did substantially burden the companies because
they either have to "engage in conduct that seriously violates their re-
ligious beliefs," "be taxed $100 per day for each affected individual," or
pay a penalty of "$2000 per employee [who qualifies for a subsidy on a
government-run exchange] each year" if they decide not to provide any
coverage at all.2 16
Although the government argued for the first time that the $2000
penalty would be less-costly than offering insurance, the Court was
not persuaded and stated that "it is far from clear that it would be fi-
nancially advantageous for an employer to drop coverage and pay the
penalty."2 1 7 The Court also explained: "We doubt that the Congress
that enacted RFRA-or, for that matter, ACA-would have believed
it a tolerable result to put family-run businesses to the choice of violat-
ing their sincerely held religious beliefs or making all of their employ-
ees lose their existing healthcare plans."2 18
210. Id. at 2771.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 2773.
213. Id. at 2773-74.
214. Id. at 2774.
215. Id. at 2775.
216. Id. at 2775-76.
217. Id. at 2777.
218. Id.
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Next, the Court analyzed whether the government had shown
that the contraceptive "mandate both '(1) is in furtherance of a compel-
ling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of fur-
thering that compelling governmental interest."'2 19 The Court speci-
fied that the RFRA required that the government have a compelling
interest for "application of the challenged law 'to the person'-the par-
ticular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substan-
tially burdened."2 20 The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether
the government's interests in promoting "public health" and "gender
equality" were compelling.22 1 The Court assumed that there was a
compelling interest in "guaranteeing cost-free access to the four chal-
lenged contraceptive methods."222
As a result, the Court turned to the least restrictive means ana-
lysis and held that the government did not satisfy the standard.223
The Court suggested a less restrictive alternative in which the govern-
ment is responsible for the cost of providing contraceptives so that
there is still no cost sharing for the employees. 224 The Court rejected
the government's "view that RFRA can never require the Government
to spend even a small amount" because that approach "reflects a judg-
ment about the importance of religious liberty that was not shared by
the Congress that enacted that law."225
The Court also pointed out that the government "has demon-
strated that it has at its disposal an approach that is less restrictive
than requiring employers to fund contraceptive methods that violate
their religious beliefs" because the government "has already estab-
lished an accommodation for nonprofit organizations with religious ob-
jections."226 This accommodation allows the "organization's insurance
issuer or third-party administrator" to remove contraceptive coverage
from the group health insurance plan and provide separate payments
for contraceptive services without employer involvement in any cost-
sharing.22 7 According to Justice Alito, the dissenters identified no rea-
son "why this accommodation would fail to protect the asserted needs
of women as effectively as the contraceptive mandate" because "there
is none."228
Finally, the Court addressed Justice Ginsberg's dissent that as-
serted the majority's decision will open up the floodgates to "religious
219. Id. at 2779 (quoting RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (2012)).
220. Id. (internal citation omitted).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 2780.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 2781.
226. Id. at 2782 & n.41.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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objections regarding a wide variety of medical procedures and
drugs."229 In response, the Court described its decision as narrow
and stated that it "should not be understood to hold that an
insurance-coverage mandate must necessarily fall if it conflicts with
an employer's religious beliefs ... [given that] other coverage require-
ments, such as immunizations, may be supported by different inter-
ests ... and may involve different arguments about the least restric-
tive means of providing them."230 The Court also concluded that
there was no evidence of current insurance policies that exclude the
other types of medical procedures the dissenting opinion suggested
companies will attempt to exempt such as blood transfusions and vac-
cines. 231 Because the Court held that the contraceptive mandate vio-
lated the RFRA, it did not reach the First Amendment claim.232
Justice Ginsburg's dissent stated: "In a decision of startling
breadth, the Court holds that commercial enterprises, including corpo-
rations, along with partnerships and sole proprietorships, can opt out
of any law (saving only tax laws) they judge incompatible with their
sincerely held religious beliefs. '23 3 Justice Ginsburg noted that,
when addressing less restrictive alternatives, the Court suggested
that instead of "tolling an enterprise claiming a religion-based exemp-
tion, the government, i.e., the general public, can pick up the tab.,
234
The dissent maintained that "Congress left health care decisions-
including the choice among contraceptive methods-in the hands of
women, with the aid of their health care providers."235 According to
Justice Ginsburg, the religious-based exemption for companies im-
pinges on the interests of third parties who do not share their religious
view, "the thousands of women employed by" them, and the "depen-
dents of persons those corporations employ."236
Justice Ginsburg asserted that the Court also failed to inquire ad-
equately into the "substantial" aspects of the burden placed on the
companies' exercise of religious beliefs. 237 Instead, Justice Ginsburg
would have found that the effect on the employer is "too attenuated
to rank as substantial" because the companies need not purchase con-
traceptives and only have to place funds in the plans that would cover
this benefit along with other benefits. 23 In closing, the dissent stated:
"The Court, I fear, has ventured into a minefield" by not confining its
229. Id. at 2783.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 2785.
233. Id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 2789-90.
236. Id. at 2787.
237. Id. at 2798.
238. Id. at 2799.
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religious-based exemption under RFRA to only those "organizations
formed 'for a religious purpose."239
V. Tangential Employment Matters: Affirmative Action
and Taxation of Severance Payments
Two cases decided in the 2013-14 term are of interest to employ-
ers and employees even though the disputes did not involve claims in
which employees squared off against employers. The issues of affirma-
tive action in a state ballot initiative regarding college admissions in
Schuette is merely a step away from the issue of affirmative action
in the workplace, a major concern for our increasingly diverse soci-
ety.24 ° Also, Quality Stores provides a unique understanding of a tax
issue affecting handling of severance arrangements. Thus, Schuette
and Quality Stores offer some legal guidance for labor and employment
practitioners.
A. Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action
In Schuette, the Court decided the constitutionality of a Michigan
constitutional amendment-that arose from a voter referendum-
prohibiting affirmative action and the consideration of race during
the admissions process of state universities.2 1 Justice Kennedy, in a
plurality opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito,
found that the law was constitutional because "there is no authority
in the Constitution of the United States or in this Court's precedents
for the Judiciary to set aside Michigan laws that commit this policy de-
termination to the voters."24 2 Justice Kennedy emphasized that this
case "is not about the constitutionality, or the merits, of race-conscious
admissions policies in higher education ... but whether, and in what
manner, voters in the States may choose to prohibit the consideration
of racial preferences in governmental decisions, in particular with re-
spect to school admissions. " 243
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion, joined by Justice Thomas,
maintained the state law did not offend the Fourteenth Amendment's
239. Id. at 2805 (citation omitted).
240. See Marcia Coyle, Race Question on Hold; Ruling Doesn't Spell End of Affir-
mative Action-Yet, NAT'L L.J. (Apr. 28, 2014) (Professor Melissa Hart believes "the issue
of affirmative action is just on hold" after Schuette and will return possibly when the
Court's 2013 decision in Fisher v. University of Texas works its way back to the
Court). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, on remand from the Court to conduct a closer
review of the diversity admissions plan to ensure that it was not discriminatory, affirmed
the district court's grant of summary judgment on behalf of the University of Texas in
Fisher on July 15, 2014. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 637 (5th
Cir. 2014).
241. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1629
(2014).
242. Id. at 1638.
243. Id. at 1630.
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Equal Protection Clause because "'[tihe Constitution proscribes gov-
ernment discrimination on the basis of race, and state-provided educa-
tion is no exception." 24 4 Justice Scalia continued: "It is precisely this
understanding-the correct understanding-of the federal Equal Pro-
tection Clause that the people of the State of Michigan have adopted
for their own fundamental law ... [to insure that] they did not simul-
taneously offend it." '2 45 Justice Scalia also found that the law was "fa-
cially neutral" because it directs "state actors to provide equal
protection." 24
6
At the end of his opinion, Justice Scalia quoted from the famous
dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson247 as part of his final analysis:
"As Justice Harlan observed over a century ago, '[olur Constitution is
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.'
The people of Michigan wish the same for their governing charter. It
would be shameful for us to stand in the way."248 Justice Scalia also
asserted that it was "doubly shameful" for Justice Sotomayor to equate
the majority in support of the Michigan prohibition with "'the major-
ity' responsible for Jim Crow."249
Justice Breyer, in a separate concurring opinion, noted that "[wie
need now decide no more than whether the Federal Constitution per-
mits Michigan to apply its constitutional amendment in those circum-
stances" in which the decision making on whether to use raced-based
admissions was transferred to the voters away from unelected admini-
strators and "I would hold that it does."
250
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Gins-
burg, asserted that Michigan law violated the Equal Protection Clause
because it was oppressive to minority groups. 251 The dissent main-
tained that state voters cannot democratically ratify an amendment
that violates the Equal Protection Clause, and yet the Michigan
amendment both has a racial focus and places a greater burden on ra-
cial minorities. 252 Specifically, Justice Sotomayor asserted that "[olur
precedents do not permit political restructurings that create one pro-
cess for racial minorities and a separate, less burdensome process
for everyone else."2 53
244. Id. at 1639 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003)) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1640.
247. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
248. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1648 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
249. Id. at 1648 n.11.
250. Id. at 1651 (Breyer, J., concurring).
251. Id. at 1651 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 1653.
253. Id.
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Further, the dissent viewed section 26 of the Michigan law as hav-
ing a clear "racial focus" because the text "prohibits Michigan's public
colleges and universities from 'granting preferential treatment to any
individual or group on the basis of race."' 25 4 The Court therefore
should subject the state's action to strict scrutiny, and the failure of
Michigan to assert some compelling interest should have resolved
this case. 2 5 5 Justice Sotomayor also vehemently criticized the Court
for failing even to attempt to recognize that "race matters"2 56 while
purposefully appearing to want "to leave race out of the picture
entirely."25
7
B. United States v. Quality Stores, Inc.
In a tax case affecting the workplace, Quality Stores, the Court
considered whether, under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act
(FICA),258 employee severance payments are taxable wages. 2 59 The
Court held that severance payments fall under the broad definition
of wages under FICA.260 The Court first examined whether the defini-
tion of "wages" in FICA specifically included severance payments. 26 1
FICA's definition is "'all remuneration for employment, including
the cash value of all remuneration (including benefits) paid in any me-
dium other than cash."' 2 62 The Court concluded that "as a matter of
plain meaning, severance payments made to terminated employees
are 'remuneration for employment"' and "it would be contrary to com-
mon usage to describe as a severance payment remuneration provided
to someone who has not worked for the employer."26
3
The Court explained that severance packages are like any other
benefit that companies use to attract talented employees.2 64 Addition-
ally, FICA specifically exempts severance payments made for retire-
ment or disability.265 The Court noted "that exemption would be un-
necessary were severance payments in general not within FICA's
definition of 'wages.' "266
The Court also addressed section 3402(o) of the Internal Revenue
Code and its definition of wages.26 7 Section 3402(o) reads: "(A) any
254. Id. at 1659.
255. Id. at 1663.
256. Id. at 1676.
257. Id. at 1675.
258. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3128 (2012).
259. United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1395, 1398 (2014).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1399.
262. Id. (quoting FICA, 26 U.S.C. § 3121(a)).
263. Id. at 1399-400.
264. Id. at 1400.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1401.
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supplemental unemployment compensation benefit paid to an individ-
ual... shall be treated as if it were a payment of wages by an employer
to an employee for a payroll period."2 6 The employer argued that
the "as if" language is "an indirect means of stating that the defini-
tion of wages for income-tax withholding does not cover severance
payments."
269
Rejecting that argument, the Court said that, similar to the FICA
definition section, the definitional section for income tax withholding
has specific exemptions that do not include severance payments. 270
The Court further agreed with the Federal Circuit that "the statement
that 'all men shall be treated as if they were six feet tall does not imply
that no men are six feet tall.' ' '27 1 The Court found "that simplicity of
administration and consistency of statutory interpretation" should
also "instruct that the meaning of 'wages' should be, in general, the
same for income-tax withholding and FICA calculations.
'
"
272
VI. Unanimity While Fighting Especially over Words
A strange form of unanimity was a common theme among the labor
and employment cases of the 2013-14 term.273 The Court's ongoing bat-
tle over how to interpret the meaning of words was central to several
cases. 274 One commentator noted in 2010 that the Justices' "work
more often is deciphering the muddy language of legislative compromise
or even the ambiguous words of their predecessors on the bench. '275 In
Sandifer,276 essentially a unanimous decision of the Justice Scalia high-
lighted the key to the decision was understanding the meaning of the
words "changing clothes" while also recognizing that the terms "don-
ning" and "doffing" were important additional considerations: "We still
268. Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 3402(o)).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1401-02.
271. Id. at 1402 (quoting CSX Corp. v. United States, 518 F.3d 1328, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
2008)).
272. Id. at 1405.
273. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
274. See Sandra J. Mullings, The Supreme Court Takes on the EEOC: What's at
Stake in Mach Mining?, 65 LAB. L.J. 144, 146 (Sept. 1, 2014) (in employment discrimina-
tion cases "the Supreme Court has often harkened to the language, or 'plain language'...
in question" and it is "incorrect to infer that Congress meant anything other than what
the text does say"); see also Debra Cassens Weiss, Supreme Court Debates Word Choice
in Three Recent Arguments, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 18, 2010), http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/supreme court debates word-choice in three recent arguments/ (last accessed
Dec. 31, 2014) (the Court debated word choice in three cases in 2010, including an em-
ployment law case).
275. See Robert Barnes, In Important Cases, Supreme Court Outcomes Determined
by a Single Word, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
contentlarticle/2010/10/17/AR2010101702799_pf.html (the Court's struggle to define
the meaning of a single word, "filing," to resolve an employment case under the FLSA).
276. Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870 (2014).
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sing, 'Don we now our gay apparel' at Christmas,'... and I suppose a
well-bred gentleman still doffs his hat to a lady. '2 77 One commentator
believes that Sandifer suggested that "'preliminary' and 'postliminary'
activities are compensable under the FLSA only if they are an 'integral
and indispensable part of the principal activities for which covered
workmen are employed.' "278 Future wage and hour cases may support
employer arguments that "activities that are tangentially related, but
not integral to the performance of one's job, are not compensable prin-
cipal activities. 2 79 Already in 2014, in Integrity Staffing, the Court
held that "an activity is integral and indispensable to the principal ac-
tivities that an employee is employed to perform ... if it is an intrinsic
element of those activities and one with which the employee cannot dis-
pense if he is to perform his principal activities."2 The Court concluded
that going through Integrity Staffing's security screening before leaving
the workplace did not meet this criterion and was thus noncompensable
under the FLSA.281
Lawson was another case in which words played a key role: the
Court battled over the meaning of the words "an employee" in deciding
the scope of whistleblower coverage under SOX.28 2 Did "an employee"
only mean an employee of a publicly traded company or did an em-
ployee mean an "officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent
of such company"?2 3 In one of its classic debates over words, the
Court decided that the statute's logical reading suggested that "an em-
ployee" meant all employees of these entities.2 4 But the Court used
different approaches in determining the meaning.
Justice Scalia considered it not problematic that "an employee"
could have such a broad meaning, even if it might lead to absurd re-
sults, because clear terms must be adhered to even if those terms
allow babysitters or gardeners to be covered by SOX.28 5 On the
other hand, Justice Ginsberg's majority opinion recognized the expan-
sive nature of a broad interpretation and sought a more pragmatic
reading that would not lead to an absurd result.2 6 While Justice
277. See Adam Liptak, Justices Allow a Bit of License in Choice of Words During a
Possible Air Emergency, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/28/us/
justices-decide-on-air-safety-steelworkers-and-drug-dealers.html (last accessed Dec. 31,
2014) (comments from Justice Scalia regarding the decision in Sandifer).
278. See Lisa Stephanian Burton et al., More to Supreme Court's Sandifer Decision
Than the Definition of"Clothes," NAT'L L. REV., Jan. 30, 2014, http://www.natlawreview.
com/print/article/more-to-supreme-court-s-sandifer-decision-definition-clothes.
279. Id. (emphasis omitted).
280. Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 134 S. Ct. 513, 519 (Dec. 9, 2014).
281. Id.
282. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2014).
283. Id. at 1161-63.
284. Id. at 1176.
285. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
286. Id. at 1168 (majority op.).
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Scalia acknowledged these policy reasons, he criticized the Court for
pursuing this analysis instead of relying solely on the text. Justice Sca-
lia framed his textual concern as follows: "I do not endorse, however,
the Court's occasional excursions beyond the interpretive terra firma
of text and context, into the swamps of legislative history. Reliance
on legislative history rests upon several frail premises."2 7 He ex-
plained further that "[blecause we are a government of laws, not of
men, and are governed by what Congress enacted rather than by
what it intended, the sole object of the interpretative enterprise is to
determine what a law says."2 8 Justice Scalia added: "on most issues
of detail that come before this Court, I am confident that the majority
of Senators and Representatives had no views whatever on how the is-
sues should be resolved-indeed, were unaware of the issues
entirely."289
Justice Sotomayor's Lawson dissent rejected Justice Scalia's crit-
icism, using a concern about absurd results to conclude that Congress
could not have intended to protect babysitters and gardeners as SOX
whistleblowers. 290 Lawson, probably more than any other case last
term, thus highlights the ongoing divisions in the Court about inter-
pretation of words and how those divisions continue to affect labor
and employment law.
Both the unusual unanimity and the debate over how to interpret
the meaning of words were directly at issue in Noel Canning.29 1 De-
spite the unanimity of the judgment, the justices disagreed about
how to interpret the meaning of "recess."292 Justice Scalia's textualist
views came to center stage as he asserted in a concurring opinion that
the language in the Recess Appointments Clause clearly applied only
to intersession recesses regardless of whether presidents have made
countless appointments without complaint, inconsistent with his ana-
lysis. 293 Justice Breyer instead, in Noel Canning, examined definitions
at the time the constitutional drafters used the language and also con-
sidered the pattern of recess appointments over time.2 94
VII. Conclusion: Labor and Employment Court Concerns
for the Immediate Future
Although the debate about the meaning of words will continue to
play a key role in deciding cases, some specific areas of labor and
287. Id. at 1176 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
288. Id. at 1176-77.
289. Id. at 1177.
290. Id. at 1183-84 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
291. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
292. Id. at 2556.
293. Id. at 2617 (Scalia, J., concurring).
294. Id. at 2559-61 (majority op.).
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employment law seem ripe for further Court review. Whistleblowing,
wage and hour, labor, and employee benefits law are areas in which
the Court will be facing new issues beyond those resolved during the
2013-14 term. Also, while there were no statutory employment discri-
mination claims during this term, the upcoming docket suggests these
claims have returned to the Court's attention.
Despite concern that the Court's unanimity in some cases this
past term was specious-in light of some of the concurring
opinions-the Court is still resolving more decisions on a purportedly
unanimous basis.29 5 Whether unanimity is a smokescreen will require
more analysis of the concurring opinions. When the only exception to
unanimity is a single justice objecting to an expansive footnote, as in
Sandifer, that sounds like wide approval. However, if all the justices
agree on the result, but the concurring opinions are so different and
critical that there does not appear to be any real agreement about
how to deal with the underlying issue, such as the definition of a recess
appointment in Noel Canning, that decision suggests unanimity was
only on the surface.
Labor and employment cases will continue to be an important
area of law for the Court to consider. The 2013-14 term demonstrated
the breadth of potential labor and employment law matters. The re-
turn of employment discrimination issues during the 2014-15 term,
along with labor, wage and hour, whistleblowing, and benefits cases,
demonstrates the significance of labor and employment matters for
the Court, both now and in the future.
295. See Coyle, supra note 21.
